Quantum cryptography has been recently extended to continuous variable systems, e.g., the bosonic modes of the electromagnetic field. In particular, several cryptographic protocols have been proposed and experimentally implemented using bosonic modes with Gaussian statistics. Such protocols have shown the possibility of reaching very high secret key rates, even in the presence of strong losses in the quantum communication channel. Despite this robustness to loss, their security can be affected by more general attacks where extra Gaussian noise is introduced by the eavesdropper. In this general scenario we show a "hardware solution" for enhancing the security thresholds of these protocols. This is possible by extending them to a two-way quantum communication where subsequent uses of the quantum channel are suitably combined. In the resulting two-way schemes, one of the honest parties assists the secret encoding of the other with the chance of a non-trivial superadditive enhancement of the security thresholds. Such results enable the extension of quantum cryptography to more complex quantum communications.
Quantum cryptography has been recently extended to continuous variable systems, e.g., the bosonic modes of the electromagnetic field. In particular, several cryptographic protocols have been proposed and experimentally implemented using bosonic modes with Gaussian statistics. Such protocols have shown the possibility of reaching very high secret key rates, even in the presence of strong losses in the quantum communication channel. Despite this robustness to loss, their security can be affected by more general attacks where extra Gaussian noise is introduced by the eavesdropper. In this general scenario we show a "hardware solution" for enhancing the security thresholds of these protocols. This is possible by extending them to a two-way quantum communication where subsequent uses of the quantum channel are suitably combined. In the resulting two-way schemes, one of the honest parties assists the secret encoding of the other with the chance of a non-trivial superadditive enhancement of the security thresholds. Such results enable the extension of quantum cryptography to more complex quantum communications.
In recent years, quantum information has entered the domain of continuous variable (CV) systems, i.e., quantum systems described by an infinite dimensional Hilbert space [1, 2] . So far, the most studied CV systems are the bosonic modes, such as the optical modes of the electromagnetic field. In particular, the most important bosonic states are the ones with Gaussian statistics, thanks to their experimental accessibility and the relative simplicity of their mathematical description [3, 4] . Accordingly, quantum key distribution (QKD) has been extended to this new framework [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21] and Gaussian cryptographic protocols using coherent states have been shown to exploit fully the potentialities of quantum optics [12, 16] . These coherentstate protocols are robust with respect to the noise of the quantum channel, as long as such noise can be ascribed to pure losses [12, 16] . By contrast, their security is strongly affected when channel losses are used to introduce a thermal environment, which is assumed to be controlled by a malicious eavesdropper [12, 22] . In this Gaussian eavesdropping scenario, we present a method to enhance the security thresholds of the basic coherent-state protocols. This is achieved by extending them to two-way quantum communication protocols, where one of the honest parties (Bob) uses its quantum resources to assist the secret encoding of the other party (Alice). In particular, the enhancement of security is proven to be effective since the security thresholds are superadditive with respect to the double use of the quantum channel. Such a result is achieved when the Gaussian attack corresponds to a memoryless Gaussian channel. More generally, we also consider Gaussian channels with memory, therefore creating classical and/or quantum correlations between the paths of the two-way quantum communication. In order to overcome this kind of eavesdropping strategy, the two-way protocols must be modified into suitable hybrid protocols, which represent their safe formulation against every kind of collective Gaussian attack.
ONE-WAY PROTOCOLS
In basic coherent-state protocols [11, 15] , Alice prepares a coherent state |α whose amplitude α = (Q A + iP A )/2 is stochastically modulated by a pair of independent Gaussian variables {Q A , P A }, with zero mean and variance V − 1. This variance determines the portion of phase space which is available to Alice's classical encoding {Q A , P A } and, therefore, quantifies the amount of energy which Alice can use in the process. This energy is usually assumed to be very large V ≫ 1 (large modulation limit) in order to reach the optimal and asymptotic performances provided by the infinite dimensional Hilbert space. The modulated coherent state is then sent to Bob through a quantum channel, whose noise is assumed ascribable to the malicious action of a potential eavesdropper (Eve). In a homodyne (Hom) protocol [11] , Bob detects the state via a single quadrature measurement (i.e., by a homodyne detection). More exactly, Bob randomly measures the quadratureQ orP , getting a real outcome X B = Q B (or P B ) which is correlated to the encoded signal X A = Q A (or P A ). In a heterodyne (Het) protocol [15] , Bob performs a joint measurement ofQ andP (i.e., a heterodyne detection). In such a case, Bob decodes the R 2 -variable X B = {Q B , P B } correlated to the total signal X A = {Q A , P A } encoded in the amplitude α. In both cases, Alice and Bob finally possess two correlated variables X A and X B , characterized by some mutual information I(X A : X B ). In order to access this mutual information, either Bob estimates Alice's encoding X A via a direct reconciliation (DR) or Alice estimates Bob's outcomes X B via a reverse reconciliation (RR) [22] . However, in order to extract some shared secret information from I(X A : X B ), the honest parties must estimate the noise of the channel by broadcasting and comparing part of their data. In this way, they are able to bound the information I(X A : E) or I(X B : E) which has been potentially stolen by Eve during the process. Then, the accessible secret information is simply given by R ◮ := I(X A : X B ) − I(X A : E) for DR and by R ◭ := I(X A : X B ) − I(X B : E) for RR. Such secret information can be put in the form of a binary key by slicing the phase space and adopting the standard techniques of error correction and privacy amplification [23] . In particular, Alice and Bob can extract a secret key whenever the channel noise is less than certain security thresholds, which correspond to the boundary conditions R ◮ = 0 and R ◭ = 0. In the CV framework, collective Gaussian attacks represent the most powerful tool that today can be handled in the cryptoanalysis of Gaussian state protocols [24, 25, 26, 27] . In the most general definition of a collective attack, all the quantum systems used by Alice and Bob in a single run of the protocol are made to interact with a fresh ancillary system prepared by Eve. Then, all the output ancillas, coming from a large number of such single-run interactions, are subject to a final coherent measurement that is furthermore optimized upon all of Alice and Bob's classical communications. In particular, the collective attack is Gaussian if the single-run interactions are Gaussian, i.e., corresponding to unitaries that preserve the Gaussian statistics of the states. Notice that for standard one-way QKD, a single run of the protocol corresponds to a single use of the channel. As a consequence, every collective Gaussian attack against one-way protocols results in a memoryless channel and, therefore, can be called a one-mode Gaussian attack. Since the quadratures encode independent variables {Q A , P A }, the single-run Gaussian interactions do not need to mix the quadratures [24, 25, 28, 29] . As a consequence, the Gaussian interaction can be modelled by an entangling cloner [12] (see Fig. 1 ) where a beam splitter (of transmission T ) mixes each signal mode A with an ancillary mode E belonging to an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pair (see Appendix). Such an EPR pair is characterized by a variance W and correlates the two output ancillary modes E ′ , E ′′ to be detected in the final coherent measurement. Notice that, from the point of view of Alice and Bob, this EPR pair simply reduces to an environmental thermal state ρ E with thermal numbern E = (W − 1)/2. A one-mode Gaussian attack can be therefore described by two parameters: transmission T and variance W or, equivalently, by T and N := (W − 1)(1 − T )T −1 , the latter being the excess noise of the channel. This parameter quantifies the amount of extra noise which is not referable to losses, i.e., the effect of the thermal noise scaled by the transmission [12] . The security thresholds against these powerful attacks can be expressed in terms of tolerable excess noise {N ◮ , N ◭ } versus the transmission T of the channel. For protocols Hom and Het, these thresholds are displayed in Fig. 2 for DR and Fig. 3 for RR, and they confirm the results previously found in Refs. [31, 32] (see Appendix). 
FROM ONE-WAY TO TWO-WAY PROTOCOLS
The above coherent state protocols have been simply formulated in terms of prepare and measure (PM) schemes.
Equivalently, they can be formulated as entanglement-based schemes, where Alice and Bob extract a key from the correlated outcomes of the measurements made upon two entangled modes (see Fig. 1 ). In fact, heterodyning one of the two entangled modes of an EPR pair (with variance V ) is equivalent to remotely preparing a coherent state |α whose amplitude is randomly modulated by a Gaussian (with variance V − 1) [22] . In this dual representation of the protocol, Alice owns a physical resource which can be equivalently seen as an amount of energy ∼ V for modulation (in the PM representation) or as an amount of entanglement ∼ log 2V to be distributed (in the entanglement-based representation). Because of this equivalence, the previous entanglement is also called virtual [22] . In the above one-way protocols, all these physical resources are the monopoly of Alice and their sole purpose is the encoding of secret information. However, we can also consider a scenario where these resources are symmetrically distributed between Alice and Bob, and part of them is used to assist the encoding. This is achieved by combining Alice and Bob in a two-way quantum communication where Bob's physical resources, to be generally intended as entanglement resources, assist the secret encoding of Alice, which is realized by unitary random modulations (see Fig. 4 ).
FIG. 4:
General structure of the one-way, two-way and hybrid protocols, together with their possible collective attacks. Circles and squares represent the physical resources available in the process. In particular, circles represent entanglement (possibly virtual) while squares are unitary modulations. In the inset (a), the basic one-way scheme is depicted, where all the resources are owned by Alice. In the insets (b) and (c), the physical resources are instead distributed between Alice and Bob, where Bob uses them for assisting while Alice for encoding (two-way scheme). Inset (d) shows the hybrid protocol where one-way's (OFF) and two-way's (ON) are randomly switched. All the insets also display Eve's collective attacks.
The inset (a) shows the collective attacks against one-way protocols (one-mode attacks). The insets (b) and (c) show instead the collective attacks against the two-way protocols. These are one-mode (or reducible two-mode) in the inset (b) while two-mode in the inset (c). Finally, inset (d) shows the effects of a two-mode attack on the hybrid protocol.
Let us explicitly construct such a two-way quantum communication. In simple two-way generalizations, Hom 2 and Het 2 , of the previous one-way protocols, Hom and Het, Bob exploits an assisting EPR pair (with variance V ) of which he keeps one mode B 1 while sending the other to Alice (see Fig. 5 ). Then, Alice encodes her information via Gaussian modulation (with variance V − 1) by adding a stochastic amplitude α = (Q A + iP A )/2 to the received mode. Such a mode is then sent back to Bob, where it is detected together with the unsent mode B 1 . Depending on the protocol, Bob will perform different detections on modes B 1 and B 2 . In particular, for the Hom 2 protocol, Bob will detect theQ (orP ) quadrature of such modes (homodyne detections), while, for the Het 2 protocol, he will detect bothQ andP (heterodyne detections). From the outcomes, Bob will finally construct an optimal estimator X B of Alice's corresponding variable X A , equal to Q A (or P A ) for Hom 2 and to the
Since Bob's decoding strategy consists in individual incoherent detections, these entanglement-assisted QKD schemes are actually equivalent to two-way schemes without entanglement, where Bob stochastically prepares a quantum state to be sequentially transmitted forward and backward in the channel. In fact, one can assume that Bob detects B 1 at the beginning of the quantum communication, so that the travelling mode C 1 is randomly prepared in a reference quantum state (which is squeezed for Hom 2 and coherent for Het 2 ). This reference state reaches Alice where stores the encoding transformation and, then, is finally detected by the second decoding measurement of Bob. Therefore, if we restrict Bob to incoherent detections (classical Bob), then the twoway schemes also possess a dual representation, where the assisting entanglement resource is actually virtual, i.e., can be replaced by an equivalent random modulation. In this dual (entanglement-free) representation, the advantage brought by the two-way quantum communication can be understood in terms of an iterated use of the uncertainty principle, where Eve is forced to produce a double perturbation of the same quantum channel. For instance, let us consider the Het 2 protocol in the absence of eavesdropping. By heterodyning mode B 1 , Bob randomly prepares mode C 1 in a reference coherent state |β containing a random modulation γ known only to him. Then, Alice transforms this state into another coherent state |α + β which is sent back to Bob. By the subsequent heterodyne detection, Bob is able to estimate the total amplitude α + β and, therefore, to infer the signal α from his knowledge of β. If we now insert Eve in this scenario, we see that she must estimate both the reference β and the masked signal α + β in order to access the signal α. This implies attacking both the forward and the backward channel (see Fig. 5 ) and, since the noise of the first attack will perturb the second attack, we expect a non trivial security improvement in the process. Such an effect intuitively holds under the assumption of one-mode attacks (where the two paths are attacked incoherently) and it is indeed confirmed by our analysis. Quantitatively, we have tested the security performances of the two-way protocols against the one-mode Gaussian attacks {N, T } and the corresponding security thresholds N ◮,◭ = N ◮,◭ (T ) are shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 (see Appendix). For the two-way protocols, such thresholds relate the tolerable excess noise to the transmission in each use of the channel and, therefore, they are directly comparable with the thresholds of the corresponding one-way protocols. By comparing Hom 2 with Hom and Het 2 with Het, one sees that the security thresholds are improved almost everywhere (the only exception being Hom 2 for T > T c ≃ 0.86 in DR). Such a superadditive behavior is the central result of this work. Roughly speaking, even if two communication lines (e.g., two optical fibers) are too noisy for one-way QKD, they can be combined to enable a two-way QKD, as long as the quantum channel is memoryless.
In order to deepen our analysis on superadditivity, we also tested the previous one-way and two-way protocols when a classical Bob is replaced by a quantum Bob. This means that Bob is no longer limited to incoherent detections but can access a quantum memory storing all the modes involved in the quantum communication. Then, Bob performs a final optimal coherent measurement on all these modes in order to retrieve Alice's information. Such a coherent measurement can be disjoint, i.e., designed to estimate a single quadrature for each encoding, or joint, i.e., designed to estimate both quadratures. Correspondingly, the modified one-way and twoway protocols will be denoted by ⊗Hom, ⊗Het, ⊗Hom 2 and ⊗Het 2 . Notice that these collective protocols may not admit an equivalent entanglement-free representation (where Bob's entanglement is replaced by a random modulation) if Bob's coherent measurement cannot be reduced to incoherent detection. The corresponding security thresholds are shown in Fig. 2 (only DR can be compared, see Appendix). It is evident that superadditivity holds almost everywhere also for these collective schemes, the only exception being ⊗Hom 2 above the same critical value T c as before. We easily note that ⊗Hom coincides with Hom, while ⊗Hom 2 coincides with Hom 2 . Then, in the case of disjoint decoding, the optimal coherent measurement asymptotically coincides with a sequence of incoherent homodyne detections. As a consequence, the collective protocols (⊗Hom and ⊗Hom 2 ) collapse to the corresponding individual protocols (Hom and Hom 2 ), where there is no need for a quantum memory. In particular, this proves that ⊗Hom 2 admits an entanglementfree representation where infinitely-squeezed states are sent to Alice through the forward path, and are then homodyned at the output of the backward path. The usage of quantum memories does better in the case of joint decoding, since ⊗Het and ⊗Het 2 have much better performances than the corresponding individual protocols Het and Het 2 . As a consequence, no simple entanglementfree representation is known for ⊗Het 2 .
HYBRID PROTOCOLS
We remark that our previous quantitative cryptoanalysis concerns one-mode Gaussian attacks, which are the cryptographic analog of a memoryless Gaussian channel. However, when a multi-way scheme is considered, a single run of the protocol no longer corresponds to a single use of the channel. As a consequence, the most general collective attack against a multi-way scheme, even if incoherent between separate runs, may involve quantum correlations between different channels. In general, an arbitrary collective attack against a two-way scheme can be called a two-mode attack. This is the general scenario of Fig. 4(c) where the action of this attack on a single round-trip of quantum communication is given by an arbitrary map E 2 . On the one hand, such an attack is said to be reducible to a one-mode attack if the map can be symmetrically decomposed as E 2 = E • E (i.e., the attack can be described by the scenario of Fig. 4(b) ) On the other hand, the two-mode attack is called irreducible if E 2 = E • E (i.e., the attack of Fig. 4 (c) cannot be described by Fig. 4(b) ). The latter situation includes all attacks where some kind of correlation is exploited between the two paths, either if this correlation is classical (so that E 2 = E 2 • E 1 with E 1 = E 2 ) or truly quantum (so that E 2 = E 2 • E 1 for every E 1 and E 2 ). In order to detect and handle an irreducible attack, the previous two-way protocols, Hom 2 and Het 2 , must be modified into hybrid forms that we denote by Hom 1,2 and Het 1,2 . In this hybrid formulation, Alice randomly switches between a two-way scheme and the corresponding one-way scheme, where she simply detects the incoming mode and sends a new one back to Bob. We may describe this process by saying that Alice randomly closes (ON) and opens (OFF) the quantum communication circuit with Bob, the effective switching sequence being communicated at the end of the protocol (see Fig. 4(d) ). By publicizing part of the exchanged data, Alice and Bob can perform tomography of the quantum channels in both the ON and OFF configurations. In particular, they can reconstruct the channel E 2 affecting the two-way trip and the channels E 1 and E 2 affecting the forward and backward paths (see Fig. 4(d) ). Then, they can check the reducibility conditions E 1 = E 2 and
is Alice's publicized encoding map. If such conditions are satisfied then the twomode attack is reducible, i.e., Alice and Bob have excluded every kind of quantum and classical correlation between the two paths of the quantum communication (see Appendix for an explicit description). In such a case, the honest users can therefore exploit the superadditivity of the two-way quantum communication. If the previous reducibility conditions are not met, then the honest users can always exploit the instances of one-way quantum communication. Notice that the verification of the reducibility conditions is rather easy in the Gaussian case, where the channels can be completely reconstructed by analyzing the first and second statistical moments of the output states. Also notice that the reducibility conditions exclude every kind of quantum impersonation attack [33] , where Eve short-circuits the channels of the two-way quantum communication.
In conclusion, the hybrid protocols constitute a safe implementation of two-way protocols, at least in the presence of collective Gaussian attacks (one-mode or twomode). In the hybrid formulation, Alice and Bob can in fact optimize their security on both one-way and twoway quantum communication. The ON-OFF manipulation of the quantum communication can be interpreted as if Alice had two orthogonal bases to choose from during the key distribution process. In the presence of this randomization, Eve is not able to optimize her Gaussian attack with respect to both kinds of quantum communication and the trusted parties can always make the a posteriori optimal choice. As a natural development of these results, one can consider a situation where Bob also performs a random and independent ON-OFF manipulation of the quantum communication. Such a scheme naturally leads to instances of n-way quantum communication (with n > 2) whose security properties would be interesting to inspect in future work. In general, our results pave the way for future investigations in the domain of secure multiple quantum communications, where quantum communication circuits can in principle grow to higher and higher complexity.
general expressions for the secret-key rates (in both direct and reverse reconciliation) when the various protocols are subject to one-mode Gaussian attacks. In the following subsections, we explicitly compute these secret-key rates for all the one-way and two-way protocols. From these quantities we derive the security thresholds shown in the paper. Finally, in the last subsection, we give the explicit description of a general two-mode attack and we analyze the conditions for its reducibility. This last analysis shows the security of the hybrid protocols against collective Gaussian attacks.
Basics of Gaussian states
A bosonic system of n modes can be described by a quadrature row-vectorŶ := (Q 1 ,P 1 , . . . ,Q n ,P n ) satis-
where
defines a symplectic form. A bosonic state ρ is called Gaussian if its statistics is Gaussian [3, 4] . In such a case, the state ρ is fully characterized by its displacement Ŷ = Tr(Ŷρ) and correlation matrix (CM) V, whose generic element is defined by V lm := Ŷ lŶm +Ŷ mŶl /2 − Ŷ l Ŷ m with diagonal terms V ll = Ŷ 2 l − Ŷ l 2 := V (Ŷ l ) express the variances of the quadratures. According to Williamson's theorem [34] , every CM V can be put in diagonal form by means of a symplectic transformation, i.e., there exists a matrix S, satisfying S T ΩS = Ω, such that S T VS = ∆(ν 1 , ν 1 , · · · , ν n , ν n ), where ∆ denotes a diagonal matrix. The set of real values ν := {ν 1 , · · · , ν n } is called symplectic eigenspectrum of the CM and provides compact ways to express fundamental properties of the corresponding Gaussian state. In particular, the Von Neumann entropy S(ρ) := −Tr (ρ log ρ) of a Gaussian state ρ can be expressed in terms of the symplectic eigenvalues by the formula [35] 
Here, the information unit is the bit if log = log 2 or the nat if log = ln. An example of a Gaussian state is the two-mode squeezed vacuum state [30] (or EPR source) whose CM takes the form
where Z := ∆(1, −1) and I := ∆ (1, 1) . In Eq. (4) the variance V fully characterizes the EPR source [30] . On the one hand, it quantifies the amount of entanglement which is distributed between Alice and Bob, providing a log-negativity [36] equal to
On the other hand, it quantifies the amount of energy which is distributed to the parties, since the reduced thermal states ρ A := Tr B (ρ) and ρ B := Tr A (ρ) have mean excitation numbers equal to (V − 1)/2.
General expressions for the secret-key rates
The various protocols differ for the number of paths (1 or 2) and the decoding method, which can be joint, disjoint, individual or collective. In particular, when decoding is disjoint the relevant secret variable X is Q ∈ R (or P ∈ R, equivalently). When decoding is joint, the relevant secret variable X is {Q, P } ∈ R 2 . Under the assumption of one-mode Gaussian attacks, the individual protocols (Hom, Het, Hom 2 , Het 2 ) have the following secret-key rates for DR (◮) and RR (◭) [37, 38] 
In these formulae, I(X A : X B ) := H(X B )−H(X B |X A ) is the classical mutual information between Alice and Bob's variables X A and X B , with H(X B ) = (1/2) log V (X B ) and H(X B |X A ) = (1/2) log V (X B |X A ) being the total and conditional Shannon entropies [39] . The term
is the Holevo information [40] between Eve (E) and the honest user K = A, B (i.e., Alice or Bob). Here, H(E) := S(ρ E ) is the Von Neumann entropy of Eve's state ρ E and H(E|X K ) is the Von Neumann entropy conditioned to the classical communication of X K . For the collective protocols (⊗Hom, ⊗Het, ⊗Hom 2 , ⊗Het 2 ) we have instead
and
where I(X A : B), I(X A : E) are Holevo informations, and
is the quantum mutual information between Bob and Eve. By setting R = 0 in the above Eqs. (6), (7), (9) and (10) one finds the security thresholds for the corresponding protocols. Notice that the Holevo information of Eq. (8) provides an upper bound to Eve's accessible information. In the case of collective protocols, Alice and Bob are able to reach the Holevo bound I(X A : B) only asymptotically. This is possible if Alice communicates to Bob the optimal collective measurement to be made compatible with the generated sequence of signal states and the detected noise in the channel. Such a measurement will be an asymptotic projection on the codewords of a random quantum code as foreseen by the Holevo-Schumacher-Westmoreland (HSW) theorem [41, 42] . Though such a measurement is highly complex, it is in principle possible and the study of the collective DR secret-key rate of Eq. (9) does make sense (it is also connected to the notion of private classical capacity of Ref. [43] ). On the other hand, the quantum mutual information of Eq. (11) provides a bound which is too large in general, preventing a comparison between the collective protocols in RR.
Secret-key rates of the one-way protocols
In the one-way protocols, Alice encodes two independent Gaussian variables Q A , P A in the quadratureŝ Q A ,P A of a signal mode A, i.e.,Q A = Q A +Q A |Q A and P A = P A +P A |P A . Here, the quantum variablesQ A ,P A have a global modulation V , given by the sum of the classical modulation V (Q A ) = V (P A ) = V − 1 and the quantum shot-noise V (Q A |Q A ) = V (P A |P A ) = 1. On the other hand, Eve has an EPR source V EP R (W ) which distributes entanglement between modes E and E ′′ . The spy mode E is then mixed with the signal mode A via a beam splitter of transmission T , and the output modes, B and E ′ , are received by Eve and Bob, respectively (see Fig. 1 ). Let us first consider the case of collective protocols (⊗Hom, ⊗Het), where Bob performs a coherent detection on all the collected modes B in order to decode
For an arbitrary triplet {V, W, T }, the quadratures of the output modes, B and E ′ , have variances
and conditional variances
Globally, the CMs of the output states ρ B (of Bob), ρ E ′ E ′′ := ρ E (of Eve) and ρ E ′ E ′′ B := ρ EB (of Eve and Bob) are given by
The CMs of Bob (B) and Eve (E), conditioned to Alice's variable X A , are instead equal to
where K = B, E. For T = 0, 1 and V ≫ 1, the symplectic spectra of all the previous CMs are given by:
By using Eqs. (2) and (3), we then compute all the Von Neumann entropies to be used in the quantities I(X A : B), I(X A : E) and I(B : E) of Eqs. (9) and (10) . After some algebra we get the following asymptotic rates for the one-way collective protocols
while R ◭ [⊗Hom] → −∞, because of the too large bound provided by I(B : E) in this case.
Let us now consider the individual one-way protocols (Hom, Het). Bob's output variable is Q B =Q B for Hom, and
for Het (withQ 0 ,P 0 belonging to the vacuum). From Eqs. (12) and (14), we can calculate the variances V (X B ) and V (X B |X A ) that provide the non-computed term I(X A : X B ) in Eq. (6) . Then, we get the following asymptotic rates in DR
In order to derive the RR rates from Eq. (7) we must evaluate
where H(E|X B ) is computed from the spectrum ν E|XB of the conditional CM V E|XB . In RR, Eve's quantum variablesŶ
must be conditioned to the Bob's classical variable X B . This is equivalent to constructing, from X B , the optimal linear estimatorsŶ (XB ) E ofŶ E , in such a way that the residual conditional variableŝ
have minimal entropy H(E|X B ). For the Hom protocol, Bob's variable X B = Q B can be used to estimate theQ quadratures only. Then, let Bob estimateŶ E bŷ
so that the conditional variables are given bŷ
For T = 0, 1 and V ≫ 1, the optimal estimators are given by
and q ′′ = 0. The corresponding conditional spectrum
minimizes H(E|Q B ) and leads to the asymptotic rate
For the Het protocol, Bob's variable X B = {Q B , P B } enables him to estimate both theQ andP quadrature, by constructing theŶ E -linear estimator
For T = 0, 1 and V ≫ 1, the optimal choice corresponds to
and q ′′ = p ′′ = 0, which gives
and leads to the asymptotic rate
Secret-key rates of the two-way protocols
In the EPR formulation of the two-way protocols (see Fig. 5 ), Bob assists the encoding via an EPR source V EP R (V ) that distributes entanglement between mode B 1 , which is kept, and mode C 1 , which is sent in the channel and undergoes the action of an entangling cloner (T, W ) : C 1 → A 1 . On the perturbed mode A 1 , Alice performs a Gaussian modulation by adding a stochastic amplitude α = (Q A + iP A )/2 with V (Q A ) = V (P A ) =V and Q A P A = 0. The modulated mode A 2 is then sent back through the channel, where it undergoes the action of a second entangling cloner (T, W ) : A 2 → B 2 , where the output mode B 2 is finally received by Bob. Let us first consider the collective two-way protocols (⊗Hom 2 , ⊗Het 2 ), where Bob performs an optimal coherent measurement upon all the collected modes B 1 , B 2 in order to decode X A = Q A (for ⊗Hom 2 ) or X A = {Q A , P A } (for ⊗Het 2 ). For an arbitrary quadruplet {V , V, W, T }, the CMs of the output states ρ B1B2 := ρ B (of Bob) and
= ρ E (of Eve) are given by
with
for K = B, E. Let us consider identical resources between Alice and Bob, i.e.,V = V − 1. Then, for T = 0, 1 and V ≫ 1, all the symplectic spectra are given by:
By means of Eqs. (2) and (3), we compute all the Von Neumann entropies to be used in Eq. (9), and we get the asymptotic rates
Clearly these rates imply the same DR threshold N ◮ = N ◮ (T ) for ⊗Hom 2 and ⊗Het 2 , as is shown in Fig. 2 
we asymptotically have
From V (Q B ) and V (Q B |Q A ) we easily compute I(Q A : Q B ) to be used in Eq. (6) . It is then easy to check that the asymptotic DR rate satisfies
For the Het 2 protocol, Bob measures
from the first heterodyne on B 1 , and
from the second one upon B 2 . Then, Bob decodes {Q A , P A } via the variables
In fact, for T = 0, 1 and V ≫ 1, we have
we then compute I(X A : X B ) and the consequent asymptotic DR rate
Let us now consider Hom 2 and Het 2 in RR. In order to derive the corresponding rates from Eq. (7), we must again compute H(E|X B ) from the spectrum of the conditional CM V E|XB , where Eve's quantum variableŝ
are conditioned to Bob's output variable X B . Of course, this is again equivalent to finding the optimal linear estimatorsŶ (XB ) E ofŶ E . For the Hom 2 protocol where X B = Q B , the linear estimators ofŶ E take the form
For T = 0, 1 and V ≫ 1, the optimal ones are given by q
The corresponding conditional spectrum is given by
This leads to the asymptotic rate
For the Het 2 protocol, where X B = {Q B , P B }, we havê
The corresponding conditional spectrum is given by ν E|QB ,PB → {n 1 , n 2 , n 3 , (1 − T 2 )V } , where
This spectrum leads to the final asymptotic rate
Structure of two-mode attacks
Let us describe the effects of a general two-mode attack when Alice and Bob adopt the hybrid protocol. In the hybrid protocol, Bob sends a modulated pure state |ϕ B , which is coherent for Het 1,2 and squeezed for Hom 1,2 . Then, Alice modulates this state by α in the ON configuration, while she detects |ϕ B and re-sends a new |ϕ ′ A in the OFF configuration. In general, in a two-mode attack, Eve can use a countable set of ancillas which can always be partitioned in three blocks E = {E 1 , F, E 2 } (see Fig. 6 ). However, such an attack can always be reduced to the cascade form of Fig. 7 . This is a trivial consequence of the logical structure of the protocol, where the backward path (labelled by 2) is always subsequent to the forward path (labelled by 1) and, therefore, a first unitary interactionÛ can condition a second onê V , but the contrary is not possible. In the first unitaryÛ, two blocks of ancillas E 1 and F interact with the forward path (1). One output E 1 is sent to the final coherent detection while the other one F is taken as input for the second unitaryV . Such a unitary makes the backward path (2) interact with F (coming fromÛ ) and another block of fresh ancillas E 2 . The corresponding outputs of F and E 2 are then sent to the final coherent detection. Note that such a description contains all the possible quantum and/or classical correlations that Eve can create between the forward and backward paths (both Gaussian and non-Gaussian).
In the OFF configuration, the first channel E 1 : |ϕ B ϕ| → ρ A is described by the Stinespring dilation [44] E 1 (|ϕ B ϕ|) = Tr E1F Û BE1F (|ϕ B ϕ|
while the second channel E 2 : |ϕ ′ A ϕ ′ | → ρ B can be expressed by the physical representation [45] 
